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ABSTRACT: This work analyses the controversial disputes that Philip Morris brought against 
Australia and Uruguay in international investor-state arbitral tribunals. Although these disputes took 
place in different tribunals, they are about similar measures regulating the control and packaging of 
tobacco designed to reduce its consumption. Philip Morris claimed that these measures violate norms 
contained in international agreements for the protection of foreign investors, such as the provisions 
regulating fair and equitable treatment and indirect expropriation. This work examines these disputes 
in the light of the practice and case-law of previous investor-state arbitrations, in the context of the 
growing criticism of the current international rules protecting foreign investors and the most recent 
transpacific and transatlantic negotiations on this subject. 





RESUMEN: Este estudio analiza los polémicos litigios que la multinacional tabacalera Philip Morris 
ha planteado contra Australia y Uruguay ante tribunales internacionales arbitrales para la protección 
de inversores extranjeros. Aunque tales litigios tienen lugar en tribunales arbitrales distintos, se 
refieren a medidas parecidas, sobre el control y etiquetado del tabaco para desalentar su consumo. 
Philip Morris ha alegado que tales medidas violan normas previstas en acuerdos internacionales para 
la protección de inversores extranjeros, como las disposiciones sobre trato justo y equitativo o sobre 
expropiaciones indirectas. Este estudio examina tales litigios a la luz de la práctica y la jurisprudencia 
de previos arbitrajes inversor-Estado, en el contexto de las crecientes críticas a las vigentes 
regulaciones internacionales para la protección de los inversores extranjeros y de las más recientes 
negociaciones transpacíficas y transatlánticas sobre la materia. 
PALABRAS CLAVE: Inversión extranjera, empaquetado neutro de cigarrillos, expropiación 




RESUM: Aquest estudi analitza els polèmics litigis que la multinacional tabaquera Philip Morris ha 
plantejat contra Austràlia i Uruguai davant de tribunals internacionals arbitrals per a la protecció 
d'inversors estrangers. Encara que aquests litigis tenen lloc a tribunals arbitrals diferents, es refereixen 
a mesures semblants, sobre el control i etiquetatge del tabac per tal de disminuir el seu consum. Philip 
Morris ha al·legat que aquestes mesures violen normes previstes a acords internacionals per a la 
protecció d'inversors estrangers, com les disposicions sobre tracte just i equitatiu o sobre 
expropiacions indirectes. Aquest estudi examina aquests litigis a la llum de la pràctica i la 
jurisprudència de previs arbitratges inversor-Estat, en el context de les creixents crítiques a les vigents 
regulacions internacionals per a la protecció dels inversors estrangers i de les més recents 
negociacions transpacífiques i transatlàntiques sobre la matèria. 
PARAULES CLAU: Inversió estrangera, empaquetat neutre de cigarretes, expropiació indirecta, 
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You must have a cigarette. A cigarette is the perfect type of perfect pleasure.  
It is exquisite, and it leaves one unsatisfied. What more can one want? 
 




1.1. General Introduction 
In March 2010, one of the leading cigarette manufacturers in the world 2 , Philip Morris 
International instituted international proceedings against Uruguay to vindicate the rights it 
contended that it was owed through a bilateral trade agreement (‘BIT’) signed between that 
country and Switzerland (‘the Uruguay BIT’). It claimed its intellectual property had been 
expropriated by Uruguay and demanded compensation. In June 2011, the same company 
instituted proceedings against Australia under a BIT signed with Hong Kong (‘the Australia 
BIT’). In a similar way to the Uruguayan case, Philip Morris contended the intellectual 
property of its brands had been expropriated and was entitled to compensation. 
To the critics of investor-state arbitrations the cases brought by Philip Morris against Uruguay 
and Australia are merely the most egregious examples of how the law of investor-state 
arbitrations has been subverted to serve only the interests of multinational companies. Even 
amongst those that favour the current system, few think that Philip Morris could or should 
win its cases. However, for them the Philip Morris litigations are only isolated examples of 
vexatious litigation that will be adequately dealt with by the current law. 
In October 2015 hundreds of thousands of people took to the streets of Berlin to protest 
against the proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (‘TTIP’) between the 
                                                   









United States and the European Union3. The most urgent and fundamental objections voiced 
by the protestors concerned the investment chapter of the TTIP (‘draft TTIP’4). It has been 
described as a undermining democracy and threatening the ability of states to regulate in the 
interests of their citizens5. 
The litigations started by Philip Morris and the protests of civil society in the streets are 
connected. One cannot understand one without the other. I will explore how the Philip Morris 
cases have highlighted criticisms of the law of investor-state disputes. Three key areas of 
concern are the jurisdiction of tribunals, the fair and equitable ('FET') standard of treatment, 
and the law of expropriation. Although I will address all of the areas outlined, I will pay 
particular attention to the law of expropriation as this is the area on which the disputes turn. In 
addition, I will submit that the current case law does not support Philip Morris’ contention 
that there is an expropriation. However, I will explore the hypothetical situation that a country 
wished to ban tobacco products in their entirety. Although it is debatable whether a measure 
of this type would ultimately amount to an expropriation, I will put forward the argument that 
it could be. Finally, I will examine the reforms of the law of expropriation proposed in the 
draft TTIP. Rather than reducing the uncertainty in this area of the law, I will argue that the 
current drafting of the TTIP tends to codify these uncertainties. 
1.2. Introduction to the Disputes 
While both cases are taking place in different forums and concern different measures taken by 
states they share a common theme in that they concern the regulation of tobacco by states. 
More than this, they bring into relief the way which multinationals use the international 
investor state arbitration legal framework to challenge measures that states take to restrict the 
sale of tobacco products. 
                                                   
3  The Guardian, Berlin anti-TTIP trade deal rally attracts hundreds of thousand [online]. 10 October 
2015,[visited: 13 June 2016]. Available at:<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/10/berlin-anti-ttip-
trade-deal-rally-hundreds-thousands-protesters> 
4 Commission draft text TTIP – investment [online]. European Commission. September 2015. [visited: 22 June 
2016]. Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, Trade in Services, Investment and E-commerce, Chapter 
II – Investment. Available at: <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/september/tradoc_153807.pdf> 
5  Friends of the Earth.  Briefing: The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) [online]. 
November 2015, [visited: 29 December 2016]. 









The case between Philip Morris and Australia6 (‘Australia Case’) took place in the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration following the UNCITRAL rules. The dispute has its origin in the 
enactment of the Tobacco Plain Packaging Act (‘the Act’) which received Royal Assent on 
the 1 December 2011. The Act envisages the introduction of a standardised form of 
packaging for cigarettes in Pantone 448C (according to market research the ugliest colour 
identified) 7  and with all aspects of the font on the box and the shape of the cigarettes 
established by law. In addition, 75% of the front and 90% of the back of the box is covered 
by graphic warnings of the effects of smoking. 
Philip Morris Australia (‘PM Australia’) was incorporated in Victoria, Australia on the 17 
March 19548. Prior to February 2011 100% of the shares of PM Australia were owned by 
Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, a company that has its seat in Neuchâtel, Switzerland. However, 
on the 23 February 2011 Philip Morris’ Hong Kong based company, Philip Morris Asia ("PM 
Asia") bought the shares in PM Australia from Philip Morris Brands Sàrl9. 
By a notice dated the 15 July 2011 and an expanded notice dated the 21 November 2011, 
Philip Morris informed the Australian government that it intended to sue the Australia under 
the 1993 bilateral investment treaty signed between Australia and Hong Kong. As well as 
invoking some of the duties that Australia owes under the TRIPS agreement, Philip Morris 
alleged that introduction of the Act had indirectly expropriated their intellectual property10. 
This is because the intellectual property of Philip Morris is one of their most valuable assets 
and enables the company to distinguish its products from that of competitors11. As well as 
this, Philip Morris alleged that the introduction of the Measure violated the FET that Australia 
owes under the Treaty. On the 17 December 2015, the tribunal ruled that it did not have 
jurisdiction to hear the case. 
                                                   
6 PCA (UNCITRAL). Phillip Morris Asia Limited (Hong Kong) v. The Commonwealth of Australia. Case 2012-
12, Award on Jurisidiction and Admissibility, 17 December 2015. 
7 El Huffington Post, ¿Cuál es el color más feo del mundo? Los expertos dicen este, el Pantone 448C 
[online]. 8 June 2016. [visited: 16 June 2016].  
Available at: <http://www.huffingtonpost.es/2016/06/08/story_n_10351454.html> 
8 Philip Morris Asia Limited. Notice of Arbitration. 21 November 2011. At 4.1. 
9 Philip Morris Asia v Australia. Ibid. P. 163. 
10 Philip Morris Asia Limited. Notice of Arbitration. Ibid. At 6.6 








The second case is between Philip Morris and Uruguay12(‘the Uruguay case’). This is taking 
place in the ICSID in Washington D.C. and concerns a BIT concluded between Uruguay and 
Switzerland. This case was brought by three entities, FTR Holding S.A., Philip Morris 
Products S.A., and Abal Hermanos S.A., (hereinafter ‘FTR’, ‘PMP’, and ‘Abal’). They 
commenced proceedings against Uruguay in February 2010. FTR and PMP are sociétés 
anonymes incorporated under the laws of Switzerland13. FTR owned 100% of the shares of 
Abal until they were sold to Philip Morris Brands Sàrl which is a Société à responsabilité 
limitée and also incorporated in Switzerland. It owns 100% of the shares in Abal and has 
continued the litigation14. 
The dispute stems from the introduction of a number of measures taken by the Uruguayan 
government. These are the enactment of a series of ordinances of the Uruguayan Ministry of 
Public Health and the enactment of a presidential decree. These measures had the effect of 
limiting the differing packaging of cigarette brands and mandating the display of the negative 
effects of smoking over 80% of the surface area of the box of cigarettes 15 . Unlike the 
Australia Case, the tribunal decided it did have jurisdiction and, at the time of writing (June 
2016), the case continues. 
2. PROCEDURAL OBJECTIONS 
2.1. The Importance of Procedural Objections in International Investor -State 
Disputes 
Procedural objections often play a much more important role in investor -state arbitrations 
than in national litigations. The ICJ identifies three sources of international law: customary 
international law (‘CIL’), general principles of law as recognised by ‘civilised nations’, and 
conventional law16. As there is no binding custom or general principle of law that provides 
that disputes between states and investors will be submitted to international arbitration 
                                                   
12 Philip Morris Brands SÀRL, Philip Morris Products S.A. and Abal Hermanos S.A. v Oriental Republic of 
Uruguay. International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes. ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7 
13 Philip Morris v Uruguay. Decision on Jurisdiction. 2 July 2013. Para. 1 
14 Philip Morris v Uruguay. Ibid. Para. 2 
15 Philip Morris v Uruguay. Ibid. Para. 4. 
16 Article 38. United Nations, Charter of the United Nations. 24 October 1945. 1 UNTS XVI. Judicial decisions 








tribunals, it falls that states must consent that a dispute is brought to such a tribunal. Most of 
the time this consent is given in advance, in the BIT that was signed.  
The BIT also informs us exactly which investors the state has consented to having the right to 
take their case to an international tribunal. In addition, the BIT will also define which 
investments benefits from the obligations contained in the treaty. As the wording of every 
BIT differs, the exact meaning of investor and investment varies between agreements and can 
be difficult to define. In order to be able to take a dispute to an international arbitral tribunal, 
the investor must show that they fulfil the requirements as set out under the BIT. 
BITs typically specify the method through which the nationality of an investor will be 
recognised and the conditions for the admission of the investment into the territory. This 
often requires that the investor has complied with all local laws when making their 
investment. Some BITs have domestic litigation limitations which require that an investor 
takes their dispute to a domestic court before initiating international proceedings. 
From the founding of ICSID in 1966 until the year 2009, it has been calculated that 15% of all 
disputes brought under the convention were struck out at the jurisdiction phase 17 . The 
Australia Case demonstrates this point, with the case being struck out at the jurisdiction 
phase. While the Uruguay case has continued beyond the jurisdiction stage, there are grounds 
on which to criticise this result. 
2.2. Procedural Objections in the Australia Case 
Article 1(b) (i) of the Australia – Hong Kong Treaty defines investors as: 
“corporations, partnerships, associations, trusts or other legally recognised entities 
incorporated or constituted or otherwise duly organised under the law in force in its area 
or under the law of a non-Contracting Party and owned or controlled by entities described 
in this sub-paragraph or by physical persons who have the right of abode in its area, 
regardless of whether or not the entities referred to in this sub -paragraph are organised 
for pecuniary gain, privately or otherwise owned, or organised with limited or unlimited 
liability”.18 
                                                   
17  MCARTHUR, K.S. & ORMACHEA. P.A. International Investor-State Arbitration: An Empirical Analysis of 
ICSID Decisions on Jurisdiction. The Review of Litigation. 2009, vol. 2, p. 568. 
18 Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of Hong Kong for the Promotion and 








As the reader can see from the above, the definition of an investor is extremely wide ranging. 
It does not just include any legal or physical person who is legally incorporated or resident in 
the territory of Hong Kong but practically any sort of body. A definition of an investor in 
such terms is typical of many BITs. 
This approach to determine the nationality of a company is not universal. Some countries 
specify that the head office of the company must reside in one of the signatories. For example, 
the BIT between Italy and Nicaragua specifies that a company must have its ‘sede principal 
de negocios’19 in the signatory country. These provisions are designed to exclude companies 
that are not headquartered in a signatory jurisdiction. This limitation on jurisdiction is 
supported by proponents of reform because it limits the number of investors who can sue 
under a BIT. However, it would not have prevented Philip Morris from bringing the case 
against Australia. 
This line of reasoning presents interesting questions in the present case. The investor in the 
Australia Case is PM Asia, a company that undoubtedly has its headquarters in Hong Kong. 
However, PM Asia is controlled by PM International, a company that is headquartered in the 
state of Virginia, and has its executive offices in New York in the United States20. Therefore, 
while it can be said that Philip Morris Asia has its ‘sede principal’ or headquarters in Hong 
Kong, this does not reflect the fact that it is only a part of a multinational enterprise 
headquartered elsewhere. The issue of to what extent an investment must be controlled by a 
national of one of the contracting parties is further brought into relief when considering what 
investments are protected. 
Article 1(e) Australia – Hong Kong Treaty defines the investments protected by the BIT as: 
““investment” means every kind of asset, owned or controlled by investors of one 
Contracting Party subject to its law and investment policies as applicable from time to 
time.For the purposes of this Agreement, a physical person or company shall be regarded 
as controlling a company or an investment if the person or company has a substantial 
interest in the company or the investment”.21 
                                                   
19 Acuerdo entre el Gobierno de la República de Nicaragua y el Gobierno de la República Italiana sobre la 
Promoción y Protección de Inversores. 20 April 2004. Article 2. 
20 Philip Morris International. Annual Report 2014. Part I, p 1. 








Australia objected that the tribunal had jurisdiction to hear the case because PM Asia became 
an investor only after the announcement to introduce plain packaging for cigarettes had been 
made and a dispute was therefore foreseeable .22 PM Asia attempted to rebut this assertion in 
a number of ways. Firstly, it highlighted the fact that under the wording of the BIT, 
investments ‘controlled’ by a Hong Kong investor are protected. PM Asia attempted to show 
that although it did not own any equity stake in PM Australia until after the announcement of 
the introduction of cigarette plain packaging, it had exercised control of the business to the 
extent on having a ‘substantial interest’.23 The tribunal rejected this argument in the absence 
of clear evidence of PM Asia’s prior control of PM Australia.24 
The tribunal stated that the meaning of ‘substantial interest’, as stated in the BIT, ‘may be’ 
best understood as ‘an economic contribution of a certain duration which involves some 
element of risk.’25Ultimately, the tribunal left open the question whether mere management 
control would amount to a ‘substantial interest’ and allow an investor to enjoy the protections 
of the BIT.26 This can be considered a problematic result. One of the central arguments for the 
existence of BITs is that they encourage the flow of FDI to states and through this spur 
economic growth and development. If an investor can gain a ‘substantial interest’ without 
actually making this economic contribution, it would seem to undermine this central aim of 
investment treaties. 
Restrictions on the nationality of investors who can invoke BITs is an important limitation for 
states of their liability. The fact that mere management control could be sufficient to allow 
investors to benefit from the protections in BITs builds on a line of cases with problematic 
results where panels have often been slow to ‘pierce the corporate veil’ 27 of corporate 
structuring. In the case of Tokio Tokelès v Ukraine28 the fact that 99% of the shareholders in a 
company incorporated in Lithuania were nationals of Ukraine was held not to prevent that 
company suing under the BIT signed between Ukraine and Lithuania. Additionally, in the 
                                                   
22 Philip Morris Asia v Australia. Ibid. Para. 354. 
23 Philip Morris Asia v Australia. Ibid. Para. 496. 
24 Philip Morris v Australia. Ibid. Para. 509. 
25 Ibid. Para. 502. 
26 Ibid, Para. 505. 
27 DOLZER, R.  &  SCHREUER, C.,Principles  of  International Investment  Law.  2nd  ed. Oxford: University 
Press. 2008. P. 48. ISBN: 9780199651801. 








case of Saluka v Czech Republic29 the panel reasoned that it could not look at whether a 
company has invested into the country in the sense that it had made a real economic 
contribution to the country’s economy because the BIT did not give them jurisdiction to do 
so.30 
Another method to consider the nationality of an investor is presented to us by the control 
theory of investor nationality. This says that the real nationality of a company is the 
nationality of the shareholders which own it and this should be the manner to determine 
whether a company can sue under an investment treaty or not. 31The classic case of the 
Barcelona Traction Company32, a case heard in the International Court of Justice, illustrates 
this theory in practice. A Canadian company, the Barcelona Traction Company (‘BTC’), was 
declared bankrupt by a court of the host state, Spain. The circumstances of this declaration of 
bankruptcy were such that it amounted to a type of indirect expropriation. The Canadian 
government made no complaint about the actions of the Spanish government. The majority 
shareholder in BTC was a Belgian company called SIDO and the Belgian government 
attempted to pursue Spain on behalf of the shareholders who were its nationals.33 
The ICJ refused their demand on the basis that the nationality of a company is determined by 
its nationality of incorporation, not the nationality of its owners.34 There were good practical 
reasons for this result. The shareholding of a publicly listed company changes continuously 
and through this the nationality of the owners of the capital in a company change in tandem. 
Another problem is to determine the nationality of the ultimate holder of the capital.  
In our present case the shares of PM Asia are owned by PM International, a Swiss company. 
Following the control theory of investor nationality, PM Asia should be considered as a Swiss 
company with no standing to sue under the Australia BIT. However, PM International is itself 
owned by shareholders. As a publicly listed company its shares are subject to sale on the open 
market and the nationality of its shareholders change accordingly. Taken to its extreme, this 
                                                   
29 PCA (UNCITRAL). Saluka v Czech Republic. Partial Award. 17 March 2006. 
30 Saluka v Czech Republic. Ibid. Para. 211. 
31 SCHOKKAERT J. & HECKSCHER, Y., International Investments Protection. Antwerp: Bruylant. 2009. P. 257. 
ISBN-13: 9782802726289. 
32 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Judgment. 5 February 1970. I.C.J Reports 1970. P. 
3. 
33 Ibid. Para. 2. 








theory would mean that an investor of any nationality that could demonstrate that it had a 
‘substantial interest’ in the firm would be able to sue. The nationality requirements in the BIT 
would become practically non - existent. 
However, as the law currently stands, the requirements of nationality are practically non-
existent. PM International is headquartered in Switzerland. Following the tribunal’s 
conclusions in the Australia Case, it could sue on any BIT signed between that nation and 
another. This could be true even if it only exercised management control and had made no 
financial investment. If there was a BIT between Switzerland and Australia, Philip Morris 
could have sued under that treaty. However, developed countries do not tend to sign BITs 
between themselves. The practical result is that developing countries are disproportionately 
impacted by BITs. 
The fact that developing countries are respondents in investor-state arbitrations to a 
disproportionate degree is frequently cited by critics of the current system as a problematic 
result of the current law of investor-state arbitration.35 Supporters respond that developing 
countries are those in most need of FDI which BITs tend to increase 36 . However, as I 
observed before, the attraction of this capital is the main reason why countries sign BITs. If 
companies can sue without making this capital investment, this aim is undermined. In 
addition, a multinational headquartered in the developed world will be better placed to sue 
developing countries. This is because it is far more likely that there will be BIT signed 
between the developed and the developing country. It cannot even be said that the developing 
country was the recipient of development -promoting capital because management control 
suffices. 
If PM Asia could have shown that in fact it exercised management control of PM Australia 
before the dispute arose, then the claim would have gone ahead. This is in fact what occurred 
in the Uruguay case where the tribunal ruled that it did have jurisdiction to hear the case.37The 
                                                   
35 CORRERA, C.; SYAM, N. & VELÁSQUEZ, G., Los tratados comerciales y de inversión: obstáculos para las 
medidas nacionales de salud pública y de control del tobacco . South Centre Informe Sobre Políticas [online]. 12 
November 2012, No. 12 [visited: 7 January 2017]. P. 5. Available at:<https://www.southcentre.int/wp-
content/uploads/2013/06/PB-12_National-Public-Health-and-Tabacco-Control_ES.pdf>. 
36 European Federation for Investment Law and Arbitration. A Response to the Criticism against ISDS by 
EFILA. Journal of International Arbitration [online]. 17 May 2015, vol 33, núm 1 [visited: 7 January 2017]. P. 
32. Available at: <http://efila.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/EFILA_in_response_to_the 
criticism_of_ISDS_final_draft.pdf> 








only difference in the Uruguay case is that Philip Morris was not acting through its Hong 
Kong office but as though it was a Swiss company. This leaves us in the situation where an 
essentially American company, Philip Morris, can at one moment be Swiss and another time 
from Hong Kong, depending on its business priorities. 
2.3. Procedural Objections in the Uruguay Case 
The challenges that Uruguay raised to pursue their case bring important questions of 
procedure to the fore. As I have shown above, procedural requirements to arbitration often 
serve a purpose to restrict the number of cases which can be brought to international tribunals. 
I will argue that the ruling in the Uruguay case means that these requirements are significantly 
undermined. 
The Uruguay BIT contains a number of procedural steps through which a potential claimant 
must go before it can institute proceedings in an international tribunal. Before having recourse 
to an international tribunal, the claimant has to attempt to settle the disputes amicably for at 
least six months. 38  After this period, there is an 18 months domestic litigation 
requirement.39 Uruguay claimed that Philip Morris had failed to discharge both of these 
requirements.40 
The tribunal quickly rejected the objection to the six month requirement because the 
claimants had attempted to engage with the Uruguayan authorities during a six month period. 
Not having received a reply to their objections, they instituted proceedings in the domestic 
courts.41 This is an uncontroversial finding and indeed, when asked by the arbiters whether 
the six month requirement had been met, counsel for the respondent answered ‘the answer is 
yes, they satisfied the six-month requirement’.42 
Uruguay objected that the claimant had not satisfied the domestic litigation requirement 
because the domestic legal claim was made under different heads of claim. This was rejected 
by the tribunal who found that the reference to disputes in the BIT meant the domestic and 
                                                   
38  Agreement between the Swiss Confederation and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay Concerning the 
Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments. 22 April 1991. [UNTC 33771], Article 10(1). 
39 Ibid. Article 10(2). 
40 Philip Morris v Uruguay. Ibid. Para. 39. 
41 Philip Morris v Uruguay. Ibid, Para. 95. 








international claims must have the broadly the same factual basis do not need to be brought 
on the same legal basis.43 
Litigation in the domestic courts was instituted on the 9 June 2009 and the international 
arbitration case in the ICSID was brought against Uruguay on the 26 March 2010 .44 As can 
be seen from these dates, the eighteen-month domestic litigation requirement had not been 
discharged when the international case was brought. The tribunal held that this was no bar to 
the case being heard at an international level.45 I would submit that this ruling significantly 
weakens the domestic legal requirement protection for states. 
In practice this means that an investor can start international proceedings at the same time or 
very shortly after the commencement of domestic proceedings. The international litigation 
can run concurrently with the domestic litigation. It would not be at all unusual for eighteen 
months to elapse from the commencement of litigation in an international forum to the 
hearing. In addition, the tribunal does not carry out a rigorous test of whether the investor has 
litigated the matter in the national courts with any earnestness. Simply filing a claim that is 
related to the relevant investment, alleging broadly the same facts would seem to be 
sufficient. A minimal effort on the half of the investor to keep the case alive until the eighteen 
months expires or they receive a judgment will dispose of their domestic litigation duty. 
While the tribunal highlighted that the domestic litigation requirement should not be 
considered ‘futile’46 I would submit that it is exactly what the requirement becomes under this 
formulation. 
This result goes against the wording of the BIT which the tribunal pointed out as mandating 
that domestic litigation is started before ‘appeal’ may be had to an international tribunal47. It 
also seems to run counter to the spirit of the Uruguay – Switzerland BIT when this provision 
is read in conjunction with the requirement that the claimant try to resolve the case amicably 
before initiating domestic legal proceedings. To reach this conclusion, the tribunal relies on 
ICJ case-law from ninety years ago which discusses principles of public international law48. It 
                                                   
43 Philip Morris v Uruguay. Ibid. Para. 110. 
44 Philip Morris v Uruguay. Ibid. Para. 131. 
45 Philip Morris v Uruguay. Ibid. Para. 144. 
46 Philip Morris v Uruguay. Ibid. Para. 136. 
47 Philip Morris v Uruguay. Ibid. Para. 111. 
48 Philip Morris v Uruguay. Ibid. Para 145. Citing Mavrommatis Plaestina Concession case. Judgment No.2. 30 








is not clear on what basis this case should determine a question of jurisdiction in a modern 
investment law case. 
One of the leading cases regarding the expiration of domestic litigation requires is the 
Maffezini case.49  When discussing whether the reading of the BIT should be so that no 
domestic litigation requirement is necessary, the court highlighted that: 
“Claimant’s interpretation ... would deprive this provision of any meaning, a result that 
would not be compatible with generally accepted principles of treaty interpretation, 
particularly those of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties”.50 
I would submit that the tribunal’s interpretation of the Uruguay – Switzerland BIT leaves the 
domestic litigation provision deprived of any meaning. It becomes a mere formality that an 
investor must do before pursuing a claim in the international courts. 
3. FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT 
3.1. Introduction to Fair and Equitable Treatment 
This obligation to afford foreign investors of fair and equitable treatment is frequently 
included in BITs. There is also a rule of international customary law that requires that states 
act in a way that is FET compliant. Whether the standards of FET as stated in BITs is an 
autonomous conventionally agreed standard or merely a restatement of the CIL standard has 
long been a point of debate. FET is an internationally accepted minimum standard which may 
surpass the protection granted to domestic investors.51 
While some authors maintain that the meaning of FET is obvious from the plain reading of 
the words ‘fair and equitable’52, in practice, this is often an extremely difficult concept to 
adequately define. The concept is vague and all-encompassing and the International Institute 
for Sustainable Development highlights that:  
“The fundamental uncertainty regarding the meaning of the obligation has prompted 
states to explore options to prevent the steadily growing expansive reading of the 
                                                   
49 ICSID. Maffezini v Kingdom of Spain – Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction. 25 January 
2000. Case No. ARB97/7. 
50 Maffezini v Spain. Ibid. Para. 36. 
51 SCHOKKAERT, J. & HECKSCHER, Y., Ibid. P. 330. 








standard, which it is feared can be used as a tool to force states to pay for the 
development of law in the public interest where changes in the law or its implementation 
leads to costs or reduced profits for the investor”.53 
A key complication to defining the content of the FET is the debate about its exact nature. If a 
BIT contains the commitment to FET is this simply a restatement of the standard owed under 
international customary law or a guarantee of more stringent protection? Some contend that it 
is a separate, more stringent standard of behaviour. If the contracting parties had wished to 
make references to customary international law standard, they could have done so. 54 
However, others support the notion of FET as merely a restatement of the duties states owe 
investors under customary international law. For example, in a resolution adopted on the 6 
April 2011 the European Parliament stated that FET should be defined by reference to 
customary international law in the investment treaties signed with the EU.55 
In the NAFTA, article 1105 contains a provision that the contracting states will afford FET to 
investors. In a note written by the Free Trade Commission, a body that represents the 
contracting states and can adopt binding interpretations of the agreement stated that FET 
reflects international customary law.56 The wider relevance of this measure has been doubted 
because of the specificity of the language used in the NAFTA. It explicitly references 
international law and article 1105 is entitled ‘Minimum Standard of Treatment’. 
Alternatively, in BITs not reflecting the wording of the NAFTA, many tribunals have argued 
that an autonomous, higher standard of protection is most appropriate57. 
An example of this is the case of Azurix v Argentina
 58
where the tribunal held that FET was 
an autonomous concept that provides for a higher level of protection to investments. It further 
held that the reference to international law in the article guaranteeing FET set a minimum 
below which FET could not fall. The FET guaranteed by the treaty could supersede this 
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minimum found in customary international law. In a similar way, in the case of Vivendi v 
Argentina59 the tribunal found that the provision that FET is interpreted ‘in conformity’ with 
international law meant that considerations beyond the minimum standard of international law 
should be taken into account.60 
3.2. Legitimate Expectations 
The exact nature and content of the FET standard is brought into sharp relief when the 
discussion about the legitimate expectations of the investor is considered. The theme of 
legitimate expectations and the need to have a stable and transparent legal system has been 
highlighted by tribunals in other situations.61 Under the NAFTA, it has been held that the 
legitimate expectations created for the investor must take the host state’s legal system when it 
made its investment as the first point.62 The state will violate the FET standard when it 
changes the regulatory regime in a way which disappoints the legitimate expectations of an 
investor when they made their investment. 
This rule that the legitimate expectations created in the mind of the investor have to be 
considered at the moment of making the investment has been followed by a number of 
tribunals in other cases.63 An example is given by the case of Occidental v Ecuador 64. In this 
case the investor was complaining of the inconsistent way in which VAT was reimbursed by 
the state. The tribunal found that the standard of FET had been violated because the 
framework in which the investor had been operating was subject to constant and opaque 
change since they invested.65 
Another case following this line of reasoning is that of CMS v Argentina66. The guarantees 
enshrined in legislation, regulations, and the licence granted to the investor meant that it was a 
                                                   
59 ICSID. Compañiá de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v Argentine Republic –Award. 20 
August 2007. ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3. 
60 DOLZER, R. & SCHREUER, C., Ibid. P. 137. 
61 ICSID. Técnicas Medioambimentales v The United Mexican States – Award. 29 May 2003. ICSID Case No. 
ARB (AF)/00/2. Para. 154. 
62 NAFTA (UNCITRAL). GAMI v Mexico. Award. 15 November 2004. Para. 93. 
63 DOLZER, R. & SCHREUER, C., Ibid. Ibid. P. 146. 
64 LCIA (UNCITRAL). Occidental Exploration and Production Company v Ecuador – Final Award. 1 July 
2004. Case No. UN3467. 
65 Occidental v Ecuador. Ibid. Para 183. 









violation of the FET standard of treatment for this legal framework to be repudiated. The 
tribunal went on to state that ‘a stable legal and business environment is an essential of fair 
and equitable treatment.’67 
The line of reasoning present in the above cases supports Philip Morris in its assertion that the 
measures violate the FET standard. It brings the concept of legitimate expectations into a 
much wider sphere. It is understandable that tribunals will find a failure to discharge the 
obligation to provide FET to investors where specific inducements have been given to 
investors to tempt them to invest. On the contrary, the above cases concerned general 
regulatory changes. This area of law is not settled and it can be argued that to impose a duty 
to provide a stable regulatory regime is an impermissible expansion of the FET standard. 
One argument against this reading of the FET standard is provided by the existence of 
stabilisation clauses in some BITs. These clauses have their purposes to prevent the host state 
from legislating in a way that is unfavourable towards foreign investors. For example, article 
4 of the France – Montenegro BIT68 provides that: 
“Les ressortissants français, personnes physiques ou morales, bénéficieront pour les 
investissements visés à l'article 1re de la présente Convention ainsi que pour 1'exercice 
des activités professionnelles et économiques liées à ces investissements, du traitement le 
plus favorable accordé en la matière a des ressortissants de tout autre pays tiers par la 
législation yougoslave. Au cas où celle-ci serait modifiée dans un sens moins favorable, 
lesdits investissements resteront régis par les dispositions en vigueur à la date où ils ont 
été agrées”. 
The paragraph of the above article guarantees most favoured nation (‘MFN’) treatment for 
French investors. In the case of a change in the law that is unfavourable to their investments, 
the investments will still benefit from the legislation that was in force at the time of the 
investment. A clause of this nature mean that the host state is precluded from legislating in a 
manner that is less favourable to investors from the capital exporting state. In addition, the 
above example is an example of a unilateral obligation of this type. Only French investors 
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benefit from the stabilisation clause. If Argentina had wished to provide an obligation to 
provide a stable regulatory environment towards foreign investors in the CMS case, it could 
have done so explicitly through a clause similar to the above. 
A case which reflects this view is EDF v Romania.69The tribunal highlighted the dangers of 
CMS formulation being stated too broadly as it would preclude virtual any change to the 
domestic legal system. In the absence of any specific representations to the investor it is 
unlikely that a tribunal will find that their legitimate expectations have been 
disappointed.70On this basis the CMS case may have been correctly decided because the state 
granted a specific licence for the transportation of gas. The state would still be able to change 
the regulatory framework of gas transportation by waiting until licences expired or by paying 
compensation. 
Paragraph 4 of article 3 of the TTIP also reflects a recognition of the dangers of a too wide 
duty of FET: 
“When applying the above fair and equitable treatment obligation, a tribunal may take 
into account whether a Party made a specific representation to an investor to induce a 
covered investment, that created a legitimate expectation, and upon which the investor 
relied in deciding to make or maintain the covered investment, but that the Party 
subsequently frustrated.” 
By specifying that the representation was ‘specific’ the CETA formulation excludes that 
general regulatory measures could form the basis of a claim for a violation of FET. This is not 
to say that some measures of a general nature, if focussed on a particular part of the economy 
could not create legitimate expectations under this formulation71. The above wording also 
specifies that the representations would have had to induce the investment. This further limits 
the potential investors who could rely on the legitimate expectations created by government 
actions. 
An example of a case which reaffirms the right of states to legislate is Methanex v Mexic
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where it was held that the possibility of increased environmental regulation should have been 
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foreseeable by a prudent investor when they made their investment. On the other hand, in the 
Metalclad case73 the investment had only gone ahead on the reasonable belief that all the 
necessary permits had been obtained to build and operate the facility. Taken in context with 
the other case-law showing that only specific undertakings of a government can constitute the 
basis of the legitimate expectations of an investor, this point has important implications for 
the Philip Morris cases. 
3.3. Fair and Equitable Treatment in the Present Disputes 
Article 2 of the Australia Treaty stipulates that: 
“Investments and returns of investors of each Contracting Party shall at all times be 
accorded fair and equitable treatment and shall enjoy full protection and security in the 
area of the other Contracting Party. Neither Contracting Party shall, without prejudice to 
its laws, in any way impair by unreasonable or discriminatory measures the management, 
maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal of investments in its area of investors of the 
other Contracting Party. Each Contracting Party shall observe any obligation it may have 
entered into with regard to investments of investors of the other Contracting Party. This 
Agreement shall not prevent an investor of one Contracting Party from taking advantage 
of the provisions of any law or policy of the other Contracting Party which are more 
favourable than the provisions of this Agreement”.74 
In the Australian government’s response to the notice of the claim of arbitration it is 
underlined that the purchase of shares by PM Asia in PM Australia occurred only after the 
announcement of the introduction of cigarette plain packaging75. The Australian government 
also highlighted that this measure was introduced in the context of progressively stricter 
regulation of smoking in Australia since the 1970s76. In this context, it cannot be said that the 
legitimate expectations of the investor were disappointed when it made the investment to buy 
shares in the Australian business. 
Neither the Australia nor the Uruguay Treaties contain stabilisation clauses. If the states who 
signed theses BITs had wanted to give a general guarantee of regulatory stability they could 
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have done so. In addition, there were no specific representations made either generally or to 
individual domestic or foreign investors that the regulatory regime around tobacco would not 
change. 
Article 3 of the Uruguay Treaty couches the FET obligation in similar terms: 
“(1) Each Contracting Party shall protect within its territory investments made in 
accordance with its legislation by investors of the other Contracting Party and shall not 
impair by unreasonable or discriminatory measures the management, maintenance, use, 
enjoyment, extension, sale and, should it so happen, liquidation of such investments. In 
particular, each Contracting Party shall issue the necessary authorizations mentioned in 
Article 2, paragraph (2) of this Agreement. 
(2) Each Contracting Party shall ensure fair and equitable treatment within its territory of 
the investments of the investors of the other Contracting Party. This treatment shall not be 
less favourable than that granted by each Contracting Party to investments made within 
its territory by its own investors, or than that granted by each Contracting Party to the 
investments made within its territory by investors of the most favoured nation, if this 
latter treatment is more favourable.” 
The FET obligation is expressed in a similar way in the two BITs albeit with slightly different 
wording. There is an addition in the Uruguay Treaty that provides further evidence that the 
FET obligation should not extend to general legislative acts. The BIT specifies that “each 
Contracting Party shall issue the necessary authorizations mentioned in Article 2, paragraph 
(2) of this Agreement”. These authorisations are described as the ‘necessary permits’77 that 
are needed for an investment to carry out its activities once it has been admitted to the 
country. This narrows the scope of the FET obligation to a duty when granting such permits 
to specific investors. 
Even without this particularity of the Uruguay Treaty, to propose that there has been a 
violation of the FET in either case, is a difficult argument to sustain. As the draft TTIP shows, 
the FET is being increasingly understood as protecting individual investors in their dealings 
with the host state. It also gives a list of instances of a breach of the FET to situations where a 
state denies justice, breaches due process, acts in an arbitrary manner, or discriminates against 
investors based on their gender, race, or religious beliefs . 78  There have been no 
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representations made by either of the states to any tobacco company which would give rise to 
a legitimate expectation on which a claim for a breach of FET could be founded. The 
measures are general in nature and take place in the context of the increasing regulation of 
tobacco products over the last forty years. 
4. EXPROPRIATIONS AND NATIONALISATIONS 
4.1. Introduction to Expropriation 
The protection of the right to own property is one of the great constitutional rights of the 
Western legal tradition79. For example, the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) 
states, ‘Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his 
possessions.’80However it goes on to qualify this right: 
“The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to 
enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with 
the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or 
penalties”.81 
The example of the ECHR demonstrates that while the right to own property is guaranteed by 
international law, it is not absolute. The state retains the right to take property for public 
purposes. 
The two main ways that property can be taken from a proprietor by a state are through 
expropriation and nationalisation. Nationalisation is the bringing of economic sectors into 
public ownership, typically by the creation of a state monopoly. In contrast, expropriation is 
the taking of a private property for a public purpose82. 
It should be first noted that states retain the right to expropriate private property for public 
purposes. To expropriate property in a valid way, a state must (i) expropriate it for a public 
purpose, (ii) in a non-discriminatory manner, (iii) by the due process of law, and (iv) on the 
payment of just compensation. As can be seen above, the public purpose of the expropriation 
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does not negate the duty to compensate. In customary international law, the determination of 
the compensation for a valid and an invalid expropriation can differ. 
When  a  state  commits an illegal  act  such  as an invalid  expropriation, the  state  must 
compensate the investor to ‘wipe out the consequences of the illegal act’.83 The compensation 
for a valid expropriation is fixed at the fair market value of the property immediately before 
the expropriation. However, the compensation for an invalid expropriation can be fixed at a 
different point in time to fully reflect the loss of value of the property due to the 
expropriation. 84  An expropriation without compensation will be by definition an invalid 
expropriation. While the ability of tribunals to follow this rule of customary international law 
where there is a BIT that specifies how compensation should be calculated is controversial, 
commentators support that the principle of full compensation should be maintained.85 
4.2. Introduction to Indirect Expropriation 
Increasingly, the focus of international investment protection litigation has moved away from 
direct expropriation to indirect expropriations. Indirect expropriations are state actions which 
leave the investor’s title to the property intact but deny their enjoyment of their property. 
Certain actions that have the practical effect of denying an investor enjoyment of their 
property have long been recognised as giving rise to an obligation to compensate. However, it 
is more difficult to draw the line between state regulations and the measures which are taken 
that are compensable indirect expropriations of property.86 Most BITs have provisions which 
explicitly make actions which have an effect equivalent or tantamount to an expropriation 
property compensable.87 
The case-law of indirect expropriation displays a lack of consistency in which takings of 
property are indirect expropriations and therefore compensable and those that are not. 
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4.2.1. Substantial Deprivation of Property 
The starting point of an analysis of whether there has been an interference with the property 
rights of the investor equivalent to an expropriation. This reflects the classic phrasing of a 
BIT which specifies that acts equivalent or ‘tantamount’ to expropriations compensable. The 
Metalclad case gives us some useful indications on the level of interference with property that 
will amount to an expropriation. In this case, the US investor had been granted a federal 
permit to develop and operate a hazardous waste disposal plant in Mexico. Despite having the 
federal permit, the state authorities refused to allow the plant to operate88. The tribunal found 
that the actions of the state authorities amounted to an indirect expropriation of the investor’s 
property. The key to their reasoning was that the actions of the state authorities was such that 
they had the effect of ‘depriving the owner, in whole or in significant part, of the use or the 
reasonably-to-be expected benefit of property.’89 
The case of CMS v Argentina90  further illustrates this point. The Argentine government 
unilaterally suspended an agreed tariff adjustment scheme for the transportation of gas. CMS, 
an investor in the Argentina gas transportation sector, claimed that its business had been 
expropriated by this measure. This claim was rejected even though the tribunal accepted that 
it had a profound impact on CMS’s business 91 . The tribunal started that the test for 
expropriation is whether the ‘enjoyment of the property has been effectively neutralized.’92 
The deprivation of property which will amount to an expropriation has also been described as 
when an investor is ‘radically deprived’93 of their property. In addition, some tribunals have 
described that the level of deprivation must be a ‘substantial deprivation’.94 
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There is some disagreement to whether there must be an interference with the rights of 
ownership or whether a diminution in value will suffice to amount to an expropriation. 
However, on either of these tests it is clear that the interference or the diminution of value 
must be high. The investor must be left with practically no control of the investment and its 
value must be reduced to practically nothing. 
However, once a ‘substantial deprivation’ of property has been identified there is a 
divergence in the case-law of what further analysis the tribunal should carry out. 
4.2.2. Sole Effect Doctrine 
The first method to consider indirect expropriation is known as the sole-effect doctrine 
(‘SED’). This is where the tribunal looks at effect the measure has on the investment and does 
not ‘decide or consider the motivation or intent of the adoption of the [Measure].’95The 
analysis of the tribunal stops at whether there has been a ‘substantial’ deprivation of the 
property. There have been several formulations of to what extent property must be taken in 
order to amount to an expropriation. Tribunals have shied away from making a numerical 
assessment of the extent of deprivation of the property, but they have held that it must be 
complete or nearly complete.96Once it has been established that there has been a substantial 
deprivation of property, an indirect expropriation will be found. 
Several arguments are advanced to support the SED approach. The first is that there is 
nothing in the formulation of an expropriation that says that the purpose of a government 
excuses the duty to compensate. Indeed, the public purpose is only one condition of a 
legitimate expropriation along with compensation. Secondly, the supporters of this approach 
highlight that the risks to the state’s ability to regulate are overstated. Only those takings of 
property that amount to an expropriation will be liable to be compensated for. 
Critics of the SED approach to determining indirect expropriation point that it would make 
compensable several takings of property which are widely considered to be non-compensable. 
If a taking falls within the customarily accepted police powers of that state, then it is not 
compensable. 97  The exact measures which states can take which fall into their non-
compensable police powers doctrine are not yet fully identified. Despite this, the adherents to 
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the PPD would support there is evidence from state practice and an opinio juris that takings 
falling into the state’s general regulatory powers are not compensable. To ignore this rule of 
customary international law and impose the SED is to misunderstand the law as it stands. 
4.2.3. Police Powers Doctrine 
The alternative manner to determine whether there has been an indirect expropriation is given 
by the police powers doctrine (‘PPD’). The doctrine starts at the same point as the SED; that 
there must be a substantial deprivation of the property. However, unlike the SED, in order to 
determine whether there has been an indirect expropriation of property, the tribunal ‘must 
look at the real interests involved and the purpose and effect of the government measure.’98 If 
there has been a use of the state's police powers then there will be no indirect expropriation 
and therefore no duty to compensate the investor. 
The Methanex case shows how the PPD can be applied in practice. The tribunal held that 
because the measure was non-discriminatory, passed for a public purpose, and by the due 
process of law, it was not compensable. While this result may be applauded, it would seem to 
go against a reading of the provisions for expropriation that are included in most BITs. The 
plain meaning of the conditions of expropriation in the NAFTA certainly does require that a 
governmental measure fulfils these three conditions. However as it is stated in the NAFTA, it 
requires that these three conditions are met and compensation is paid. The test to determine if 
there was been an expropriation seems to have been conflated with the test of whether it was a 
validly executed expropriation. Before the tribunal can consider the four conditions of a 
validly executed expropriation, it must consider whether there has been an expropriation in 
the first place. The fact that the measure was non - discriminatory, for a valid public purpose, 
and implemented by due process do not negate the fourth condition of a valid expropriation of 
property, namely the payment of compensation. 
4.3. The Present Disputes 
Paragraph one of article five of the Uruguay Treaty deals with expropriation and 
nationalisations of property: 
“Neither of the Contracting Parties shall take, either directly or indirectly, measures of 
expropriation, nationalization or any other measure having the same nature or the 
                                                   









same effect against investments belonging to investors of the other Contracting Party, 
unless the measures taken for the public benefit as established by law, are on a non-
discriminatory basis, and under due process of law, and provided that provisions be made 
for effective and adequate compensation. The amount of compensation, interest included, 
shall be settled in the currency of the country of origin of the investment and paid without 
delay to the person entitled thereto.”99 
Article 6 of the Australia Treaty follows the classic formulation of the conditions of an 
expropriation as below: 
“Investors of either Contracting Party shall not be deprived of their investments nor 
subjected to measures having effect equivalent to such deprivation in the area of the 
other Contracting Party except under due process of law, for a public purpose related to 
the internal needs of that Party, on a non-discriminatory basis, and against 
compensation”.100 
There are differences between the two provisions. The Uruguay BIT classifies as an indirect 
expropriation any measure having the same ‘nature’ or ‘effect’ as an expropriation. 
Conversely, the Australia Treaty classifies indirect expropriations simply as those measures 
having ‘effect equivalent’. It could be contended that the Uruguay BIT allows a tribunal to 
adopt a PPD reading of the provision. In a way that is not usual to BITs, it explicitly 
empowers the tribunal to look at the purpose behind the measure. 
Another difference is that the Australia Treaty only allows expropriations for a public purpose 
which is related to the internal needs of the party. It could be hypothesised that at the time of 
drafting the BIT this was included because the negotiators feared that property in Hong Kong 
could be expropriated for a public purpose related to other territories of the People’s Republic 
of China, of which Hong Kong is now a part. In any event, the protection of human health is 
undoubtedly a public purposes related to the internal needs of Australia.  
In their notice of arbitration, Philip Morris contended that ‘Plain packaging legislation 
destroys the commercial value of the intellectual property and goodwill’. 101  While it is 
undeniable that the measures taken by the Australian government deprive Philip Morris of the 
near totality of its intellectual property, that is not the same as expropriating its business.  
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If we look at the tests employed in the cases above, it appears that the test is whether the 
business as a whole is left with any commercial value. Philip Morris is not being prohibited 
from selling cigarettes and indeed continues to make a considerable profit in Australia. On 
this basis, to establish that the actions of the Australian state amounted to an indirect 
expropriation is a difficult argument for Philip Morris to make. 
This is not to say it would be an impossible argument. In some circumstances tribunals have 
considered that the rights of investors can be partially expropriated, regardless of their control 
over the totality of the property. For example in the case of Middle East Cement v Egypt102 the 
investor had obtained a licence to import cement and built infrastructure to distribute cement. 
Egypt subsequently revoked the licence, leaving the infrastructure worthless and seized and sold a 
ship owned by the claimant. 103  The tribunal decided that the licence to operate was a separate 
investment to the infrastructure104, the revocation of which was compensable. 
Another example is given by the case of Eureko v Poland105 .In this case an investor acquired 
a minority interest in a privatised insurance business and was granted the right to obtain the 
majority in the business. The Polish government repudiated this right meaning the investor 
could not obtain the majority share in the business. 106  The original investment was not 
affected by the repudiation of the right to acquire a majority share in the business. The 
tribunal considered that the repudiation of this subsequent right could be considered as an 
expropriation.107 
It can be argued that the measures taken by Australia and Uruguay can be distinguished from 
the above cases. In the Middle East Cement case the revocation of the licence was held to be 
compensable because it subsequently left the rest of the business without value and was 
therefore a taking.108 As I have shown above, the measures do not substantially deprive Philip 
Morris of its business in Australia or Uruguay. 
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In addition, a key distinction should be made between the above cases and the present 
disputes. In both of these cases the state had made a specific promise to the investor through a 
licence or a contract. It is debatable whether indirect expropriation was the most appropriate 
way to plead these cases. There is a great deal of potential overlap of the law governing 
umbrella clauses. In addition, it can be argued that these case is best understood under the law 
of FET. A specific representation was made to the cement importer through the granting of 
the licence that they would be able to import and distribute cement for a ten year period. The 
importer relied on this representation to invest in Egypt. They could not subsequently 
complain that their business was expropriated if at the end of the ten year period the licence 
was not renewed. No such specific representations were made in either the Australia or the 
Uruguay cases. 
The Eureko case is also best understood following the law of FET. The bulk of the tribunal’s 
judgment deals with the violations of FET and the umbrella clause. A mere six paragraphs of 
the judgment are devoted to the law of indirect expropriation. I would submit that the case is 
best understood in the terms of the legitimate expectations of the investor. The reason why it 
was held that there was unfair and inequitable treatment of the investor was because the 
Polish government had promised to sell the shares to give Eureko a controlling interest. This 
raised a legitimate expectation upon which the investor relied. If the Polish government had 
granted a promise to sell the shares but reserved the right to cancel this promise, then it could 
not be said that the legitimate expectations of the investor would be disappointed. Equally, it 
could not be said that a right to buy which was revocable at any time would be an investment 
that could be expropriated. 
The Uruguay measures differ from the Australian ones in a way which is relevant to 
determine whether there has been a ‘substantial deprivation’ of Philip Morris’ property for the 
purposes of indirect expropriation. In Uruguay cigarettes manufacturers will only be able to 
sell one variety of cigarettes under each brand to prevent the rebranding of cigarettes as 
lighter and therefore healthier.109Once again, it is impossible to show that the value of Philip 
Morris’ business in Uruguay has been reduced to nothing. The Uruguayan measure also does 
not prohibit all branding on cigarettes but merely increases the size of the warnings against 
the dangers of smoking. Even if the intellectual property of the cigarette brands could be 
                                                   








separated from the ownership of the other parts of the investment, the value of the intellectual 
property has not been effectively neutralised. 
Alternatively, the wording of the Uruguayan BIT could empower the tribunal to consider the 
measure following the police powers approach. While there are no cases where the protection 
of public health has justified an expropriation without compensation, there is evidence that 
tribunals would afford a wide latitude to states to act.110Furthermore, it can be contended that 
the Uruguayan measures are of a general, non-discriminatory nature and therefore fall into the 
police powers of the Uruguayan state. 
A key question of the case-law is: when the tribunals referred to the word ‘property’ are they 
referring to the property in its entirely or to specific aspects of it? The word ‘property’ has 
been used by the tribunals to refer to the totality of the investment and by Philip Morris to 
refer to the intellectual property contained within the packaging of cigarettes. From the point 
of view of an investor-state tribunal, the intellectual property of an investor is just another part 
of their wider property which is protected under international customary law and international 
investment treaties. The substantial interference in one aspect of the investor’s property will 
not constitute an indirect expropriation while the value of the investment has not been reduced 
to near worthlessness. 
It therefore seems that whether we consider the measure following the SED or the PPD 
approach, it seems likely that Philip Morris would lose its cases on their merits. While the 
Australian litigation has been resolved by the tribunal declining jurisdiction due to abuse of 
process, at the time of writing111 the Uruguay litigation goes on. If we can say with some 
certainty that Philip Morris would lose its cases, can we say that the current law of 
expropriation is adequate? I will present a problem which suggests it is not. 
4.4. A Case for Reform of the Law of Indirect Expropriation 
It would appear from the current case-law that the measures introduced by Australia and 
Uruguay would not give rise to an expropriation. However, if a state wish to ban tobacco 
products in their entirety, the current case-law leaves it open to argue that such a measure 
would be an indirect expropriation. While at the time of writing, only one state (Bhutan) has 
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outlawed tobacco completely112, it is not inconceivable that within a number of decades, 
states like Australia may wish to prohibit the sale of cigarettes. It is possible that a measure 
outlawing the sale of tobacco products could constitute an indirect expropriation. While the 
investor would remain in control of their investment in name, the whole infrastructure of 
cigarette manufacture and distribution would become worthless. It is possible to envisage a 
measure with this effect amounting to a substantial deprivation of the investment and 
therefore an indirect expropriation. 
Whether the prohibition of the sale of cigarettes would amount to an indirect expropriation is 
controversial. States prohibit and restrict the sale of products all the time and there has been 
no case so far that has held that such general regulatory measures would amount to an indirect 
expropriation. A WTO case that may provide some insight into how a tribunal could consider 
the question of indirect expropriation in this case is the Asbestos case113. The Appellate Body 
reaffirmed the right of states to protect their citizens from the health effects of asbestos as 
they see fit without discussion of compensation for the asbestos manufacturers.114 
However, the TTP treaty states may request the non-applicability of the investment chapter to 
tobacco regulation.115 This is true even if a dispute is on-going with a tobacco manufacturer. 
The fact that tobacco was excluded from the investor-state chapter could suggest that states 
do not think they could win a challenge to further tobacco regulation, at least without more 
costly and time-consuming litigation. Clearly while this approach solves the problem for 
states for tobacco, it leaves the problem unresolved for the rest of the economy. A more 
comprehensive approach would be to clearly delimit the types of regulation that will not give 
rise to a finding of indirect expropriation. 
Having said this, there has been no case brought against a state for a prohibition of this nature 
brought in an international tribunal. As I have endeavoured to show, the law of indirect 
expropriation is very unclear and it is possible to make arguments in favour of compensation. 
The distinction between legitimate government regulation which does not give rise to a duty 
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to compensate investors and indirect expropriation which does ha s been criticised as 
artificial: 
“Is this distinction intellectually viable? Is not the State in both cases (that is, either by 
taking for a public purpose [indirect expropriation], or by regulating) purporting to act in 
the common good? And in each case has the owner of the property not suffered a 
loss?”116. 
Where is the line drawn between those takings that are compensable and those that are not? 
Until that line can be drawn with clarity, states cannot be sure that they would win a challenge 
to a prohibition of cigarette sales. This is especially true considering t hat cigarette 
manufacturers are extremely well-financed and can afford to challenge attempts to regulate at 
multiple levels of national and international law. This result seems wrong, after all; is the 
protection of human health not one of the prime responsibilities of states? It would seem that 
states face the unappealing choice of either allowing investment activities which are 
damaging to society or compensating investors to remedy these problems.  
Another reason that reform is desirable is because under the current law of indirect 
expropriation, cases have been very long and very expensive. The Australian litigation started 
in early 2011 and the redacted judgment was not delivered until May 2016. In addition, the 
Australian government estimates that it has spent A$50 million (€32 million) defending the 
Philip Morris case117. This sum would have been even higher had the case proceeded beyond 
the jurisdiction phase. The Uruguay case started even earlier, in March 2010, and a judgment 
still has not been delivered as of June 2016. 
4.5. Appropriation in Indirect Expropriation 
One suggestion to resolve the issue of government regulation is to consider whether there has 
been any appropriation of property by the host government.118 In a series of cases, it has been 
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long established that the fact that the host country was not directly enriched by the 
expropriation, does not affect its classification as an expropriation 119 . However, A. 
Newcombe highlights a series of early cases which challenges this orthodoxy.120 For example, 
he points out that the cases of the Norwegian Shipowners Claims121 and the Certain German 
Interests in Polish Upper Silesia122, are traditionally cited as founding the rule that the state 
does not need to be enriched by its expropriation. However, in bot h of these cases there was a 
corresponding appropriation of the property by the state123. This test, when applied to the 
introduction of plain packaging for cigarettes, precludes the measure being characterised as an 
expropriation. The Australian or Uruguayan governments have not appropriated Philip 
Morris’ intellectual property for their own use. 
At paragraph 2(d) of article 8 of the draft TTIP text, tribunals are asked to consider the 
following when determining whether an indirect expropriation has taken place: “The 
character of the measure or series of measure, notably their object, content and intent”. 
We can see from the above, 2(d) requires that a tribunal considers the purpose of the 
legislation which has been passed. Presumably if the intent of the measure is not 
expropriatory, then the tribunal should find that it does not violate the TTIP. This has been 
described as problematic because the expression of intent of a state to expropriate property is 
in the case of indirect expropriation, excluded by definition124. It is also difficult to factually 
prove that a state had the intent to expropriate the investor’s property.125 
4.6. The Draft TTIP Proposals for Indirect Expropriation 
The TTIP being negotiated between the US and the EU is an example of a new generation of 
agreement which aims to resolve the problems identified with traditional BITs. In doing so, 
they have abandoned reliance on the SED and expressly purport to introduce a variation of 
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PPD which considers the proportionality of the government measure taken. The aim of the 
draft TTIP is clear; to restrict the situations when a tribunal can find an indirect expropriation. 
However, the manner in which it tries to do this tends more to increase uncertainty. 
At article 5 of section 2 of chapter 2 of the TTIP text replicates the classic formulation of 
expropriation: 
“1. Neither Party shall nationalize or expropriate a covered investment either directly or 
indirectly through measures having an effect equivalent to nationalisation or 
expropriation (hereinafter referred to as 'expropriation') except: 
(a) for a public purpose; 
(b) under due process of law; 
(c) in a non-discriminatory manner; and 
(d) against payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation”.126 
A replication of the formulation of expropriation as it appears in traditional BITs already 
presents a problem. By repeating the wording of previous bilateral agreements, the provisions 
invites the tribunal to call upon the existing case-law of expropriation. This is a case-law 
which is very unclear and inconsistent. Faced with this problem the provision continues: “2. 
For greater certainty, this paragraph shall be interpreted in accordance with Annex I” [on 
expropriation]. 
The use of the phrase ‘For greater certainty’ is once again problematic. It suggests that the 
law of expropriation is already certain and the annex is merely a guide on how to inter pret 
some of the finer points of this area of law. As I have endeavoured to show, the classic 
formulation is anything but certain. Therefore the annex will become a vital tool in order to 
give some clarity to this area of law. 
The annex127 states: 
“ANNEX I: Expropriation 
The Parties confirm their shared understanding that: 
1. Expropriation may be either direct or indirect: 
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(a) direct expropriation occurs when an investment is nationalised or otherwise directly 
expropriated through formal transfer of title or outright seizure. 
(b) direct expropriation occurs where a measure or series of measures by a Party has an 
effect equivalent to direct expropriation, in that it substantially deprives the investor 
of the fundamental attributes of property in its investment, including the right to use, 
enjoy and dispose of its investment, without formal transfer of title or outright 
seizure. 
2. The determination of whether a measure or series of measures by a Party, in a 
specific fact situation, constitutes an indirect expropriation requires a case-by-case, fact-
based inquiry that considers, among other factors: 
(a) the economic impact of the measure or series of measures, although the sole fact that 
a measure or series of measures of a Party has an adverse effect on the economic 
value of an investment does not establish that an indirect expropriation has occurred; 
(b) the duration of the measure or series of measures by a Party; 
(c) the character of the measure or series of measures, notably their object and content. 
3. For greater certainty, except in the rare circumstance when the impact of a measure or 
series of measures is so severe in light of its purpose that it appears manifestly excessive, 
non-discriminatory measures of a Party that are designed and applied to p rotect 
legitimate public welfare objectives, such as the protection of public health, safety, 
environment or public morals, social or consumer protection or promotion and protection 
of cultural diversity do not constitute indirect expropriations”. 
The first paragraph appears to codify the approach tribunals have taken when considering the 
SED. It echoes the traditional BIT wording by specifying measures having ‘effect equivalent’ 
to an expropriation. It also codifies the substantial deprivation test by recalling the 
formulation of this test by some tribunals as one where an investor is denied the ‘fundamental 
attributes’ of property. If this article was the only provision of the annex, tribunals could feel 
empowered to follow the line of cases encapsulating the SED. In this way, at least the 
uncertainty around this law would be reduced. Tribunals would also know within which 
conceptual framework they should be debating interpretations of the law.  
However, this is not the case. Paragraph two states that expropriation should be considered 
through a ‘case-by-case, fact-based enquiry’. The provision then goes on to say that the 
tribunal should consider the economic impact, duration and character of the measure. It also 
contains what seems to be an explicit rejection of the SED by specifying that the mere fact 








an indirect expropriation. By asking a tribunal to consider each case as different could 
undermine a key aim of the TTIP; to provide greater consistency to the law.  
It could also create unnecessary litigation. When the law is unclear parties tend to litigate on 
every point. This is what happens in investor-state arbitrations contributing to their slowness 
and expense.128 By reiterating that the considerations of the cases must be done individually 
and through a fact-based inquiry, these tendencies are exacerbated. It is of course possible that 
this paragraph is superfluous. Like any court, international tribunals already carry out case-
by-case, fact-based inquiries. 
Paragraph three seems to codify the approach that tribunals have adopted when following the 
PPD approach to indirect expropriation. As well as this, it appears to invite a tribunal to 
consider the proportionality of the measure. If the measure is ‘manifestly excessive’ to its aim 
then there will have been an expropriation. This adds another element of uncertainty into the 
article. When will a measure be ‘manifestly disproportionate’? While there are many 
examples of tribunals considering the proportionality of a measure with its aims in 
international law, the phrase ‘manifestly’ is not used to describe a measure disproportionate to 
its aims.129 
Each of the paragraphs of the TTIP formulation could be a method to determine whether there 
has been an indirect expropriation of property on their own. How each paragraph relates to 
the other, and which should be given precedence by a tribunal in the case of conflict between 
them is extremely unclear. Each one seems to codify approaches taken by tribunals under the 
different doctrines of SED and PPD. Rather than clarifying by choosing one approach, the 
TTIP codifies the confusion and inconsistency of the current case-law. 
Having said that, it should be said that there is EU case-law which does touch upon the 
proportionality of measures to their aims. In particular, an annex to the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’)130 mandates that the economic impact of a 
measure must be taken into account when European legislation is passed. 
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An example of the importance of this provisions is shown by the challenge to Commission 
Directive 2014/40131 in the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’) brought by 
Poland.132 The Directive more tightly regulates various aspects of tobacco sales including 
banning mentholated cigarettes. One of the assertions of Poland was that this ban was 
disproportionate to the aim of protecting human health. 133  The court noted that the EU 
legislature had noted the possible negative economic social effects of the measure and had 
enacted ways by which these negative effects would be limited.134 The fact that the legislature 
considered the economic impact on tobacco producers and sought to limit them was 
considered by the court as strong evidence that the measure was proportionate. 135  This 
example shows us how current EU law does not consider that investors should be 
compensated for measures which negatively affect them. It also leaves the political decision 
to balance the competing interests of general and society and investors to elected politicians. 
Faced with the confusion of the TTIP in its current draft, it is impossible to predict how the 
hypothetical example of the complete prohibition of tobacco products would be considered. I 
have considered the approach as should be considered under the SED, an approach which is 
arguably the correct one under the current formulation of indirect expropriation. I will now 
consider the element of proportionality, as it is contained in the TTIP. 
4.7. Proportionality in Indirect Expropriation 
An interesting case which demonstrates how the TTIP proportionality could consider a 
prohibition of tobacco is provided by Philip Morris v Norway136 case held under the European 
Economic Area (EEA) Agreement. This agreement provides for free trade between the 
European Union and Liechtenstein, Norway, and Iceland. It applies the European Union 
treaties and applies the same rules as the CJEU and is thus an illustrative example of 
European jurisprudence in this area. 
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The case concerned a measure taken by Norway to ban all point of sale advertisements of 
cigarettes and tobacco products in its territory. While this measure falls short of a total ban of 
tobacco in a jurisdiction, it does illustrate the legal tests that could be used to determine 
whether there is an indirect expropriation. 
In the Norway case the European Free Trade Association Court found that such a ban was 
indirectly discriminatory against products coming from within the EEA and could only be 
justified under article 13 of the Agreement of the EEA. This article allows measures having 
discriminatory effect if they were both for a legitimate public good and proportionate to 
achieve this good. On this point the court said: 
“In the area of human health EEA States should enjoy a wide margin of discretion. 
Accordingly, in the present case, it is not enough for the Plaintiff to allege that no 
evidence can be produced to support the argument that a visual display ban influences 
tobacco consumption. Instead, it suffices to show, as the Defendant has done, that there 
are reasonable grounds to assume that the display ban will have an effect on 
consumption”.137 
As we can see from the above formulation, this is a test which does not demand that a state 
actually shows that the measure will reduce consumption but that there are reasonable 
grounds to assume it does. When considering the issue of proportionality in the EEA the 
measure must be the least restrictive measure to the circulation of goods available to meet the 
public welfare objective. This is a higher test than that which is contained in the TTIP where 
the disproportionality of the impact of the measure must be ‘manifestly excessive’. 
However, even considering a higher test contained in the TTIP, the EFTA Court can give 
useful guidance to tribunals. When considering the jurisprudence of proportionality in the 
EEA, the court stated: 
“[…] that an assessment of whether the principle of proportionality has been observed in 
the field of public health must take account of the fact that an EEA State has the power to 
determine the degree of protection that it wishes to afford to public health and the way in 
which that protection is to be achieved”.138 
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I would submit that here the EEA formula is a step in the right direction to balance the 
competing demands of states and investors. States are left to carry out the sovereign functions 
of determining which public welfare objectives should be prioritised and the manner in which 
they will be achieved. In the case of there being no relation between the measure taken and 
the public good or of its being manifestly excessive in its impact on an investor, that investor 
will receive compensation to the degree that their property has been indirectly expropriated. 
When applied to the example the complete prohibition of tobacco, this reaffirmation of the 
state’s power to set the priorities for legislation is welcome. While one state may prioritise 
human health and ban smoking completely, another state may prioritise tax revenue growth 
and be involved in the sale and distribution of cigarettes. The key would be for the state to 
correctly phrase the public welfare they are trying to achieve. For example, if a state says that 
it is merely trying to reduce tobacco consumption, it may be open to a tribunal to say that a 
complete prohibition of the sale of cigarettes is manifestly disproportionate. 
On the other hand, if a state says that it wishes to reduce the number of smoking-related 
deaths to zero, a complete ban on all tobacco products would seem a necessary step to 
achieving this. The European jurisprudence on proportionality shows us that it is not open to 
tribunals to question the legislative priorities of the state. The TTIP formulation of 
proportionality can restrict tribunals’ role to testing that there has been no protectionist 
behaviour in the guise of protecting human health by seeing if there is a logical connection 
between the aim and the measure and the measure is not manifestly excessive. Providing there 
is a logical connection between the aim and the public welfare attempting to be achieved, a 
measure to ban cigarettes would seem to be permitted under a proportionality test of this type.  
At this point it is convenient to highlight the limits to help which European jurisprudence can 
help tribunals considering the TTIP. European law uses different principles than international 
investment law. In particular it applies a much stricter rule of proportionality than the wording 
of the TTIP would allow. For example, in the Scottish alcohol case139 the tribunal struck 
down legislation establishing a minimum price of alcohol. The tribunal established that the 
measure disproportionality affected alcohol imported from other EU states and was therefore 
a restriction on trade.140It then fell to the tribunal to decide whether this restriction on trade 
was proportionate to the Scottish government’s public health objective (reducing hazardous 
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alcohol consumption). The CJE decided it was not because there are other less restrictive 
means of achieving a reduction in the number of people drinking alcohol to hazardous levels 
such as general taxation on alcoholic drinks.141 This test is well-established in EU case-law 
and fits within the constitutional structure of the democratic institutions of the EU. 
International tribunals will only be empowered to order compensation for that legislation 
which is manifestly excessive. ‘Manifestly excessive’ is a much higher level than in EU law 
and tribunals would be unwise to follow too closely EU case-law in this respect. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
In conclusion, the cases brought against Uruguay and Australia by Philip Morris illustrate 
many important questions for the law of investor-state disputes. Current case law 
significantly weakens the jurisdictional protections contained for states. It also weakens the 
domestic litigations requirements which require an investor to seriously engage with the 
domestic legal system of the host nation. Additionally, the cases show how the law of FET 
must not be allowed to impose an impermissible restraint on the ability of states to legislate. 
While the law of expropriation remains unclear and contradictory, a number of common 
elements can be drawn out. Firstly, the taking of the property must be substantial, meaning 
nearly complete. Secondly, tribunals have usually considered the effect on the property as a 
whole, not as individual parts of property. Thirdly, in certain circumstances customary 
international law allows states to take property for public purposes without the payment of 
compensation. 
As I have previously stated, the weight of authority seems to suggest that Philip Morris will 
not win its cases for expropriation. However, as I have also highlighted, this result comes 
after years of litigation which has cost the Australian and Uruguayan taxpayers millions of 
dollars. The fact that Philip Morris was even able to advance its case is evidence enough of 
the need for reform. 
The TTIP investment chapter goes some way to advancing this reform. It clearly tries to 
exclude general regulatory measures from being considered expropriations in all those except 
the most exceptional cases. This is a more comprehensive approach to reform than that 
followed in the TTP where tobacco regulation can simply be excluded from the investment 
                                                   








chapter. However, the manner in which it does this serves only to reinforce the conflicts and 
confusion which is at the heart of the current law of expropriation. It calls upon the case-law 
of tribunals which have adhered to both the SED and the PPD. In goes on to reiterate that 
every case should be considered individually, a formulation tending towards unnecessary 
litigation. 
Fundamentally a political decision needs to be made to what extent states wish to protect 
property at the expense of their ability to regulate. The SED embedded in the traditional 
formulation of BITs is not accidental. They were designed in a period when countries were 
newly independent and asserting their sovereignty over their natural resources. 142During this 
period many countries denied that there was even a rule of customary international law to 
compensate investors for expropriations.143 The formulation of BITs was in direct opposition 
to these trends and codifies a very strong defence of investor’s property rights. 
The world has changed since then. These agreements have been signed by every country in 
the world yet the wording of the BITs remains unchanged from the original treaties, drafted in 
the 1960s in a particular political context. Furthermore, traditionally capital-exporting 
countries in the developed world are now importers of capital as well. The obligations that for 
a long time have only been felt by developing countries are now felt everywhere. It has 
become clear that for many people, the privileging of the protection of property over the 
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